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Mine action mostly occurs in post-conflict and unstable environ-ments. Always a turbulent period 
for a country, the post-conflict phase is char-
acterized by abrupt changes and weak govern-
ment institutions. In addition, a country may 
face a sluggish economy, fragile infrastructure, 
poverty, high unemployment and political in-
stability, thereby creating a very complex situa-
tion for mine-action operations. 
A realistic question might be why an organi-
zation would consider developing a mine-action 
program in such an unstable environment. Sev-
eral reasons are fairly obvious: to prevent mine 
accidents or at least reduce their number; to 
provide immediate assistance to victims of ex-
plosive remnants of war; to begin building the 
foundation for economic and social recovery; 
and to provide assistance to and resettlement 
for refugees and internally displaced persons. 
While one might assume that the governments 
of mine-affected countries, having the strongest 
interest in mine action, would provide whatev-
er is necessary to execute mine-action activities, 
the reality, unfortunately, is often otherwise. 
Political Instability
Conditions such as armed clashes2 and in-
surgencies3 can result in the termination of 
activities and mine-action programs. A signif-
icant number of disillusioned ex-soldiers and 
armed insurgents will often resort to criminal 
activities and general banditry.4 Though uni-
lateral support from the host country for hu-
manitarian organizations would provide the 
best foundation for mine-action activities, 
post-conflict governments are often torn apart 
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Because of the nature of mine-action organizations and programs, they are often placed 
in post-conflict areas where humanitarian work faces several obstacles. It is important to 
consider possible setbacks before embarking on demining in a post-conflict country. 
by rampant political corruption and are unable 
to address their country’s issues or provide the 
necessary support to those organizations oper-
ating in their country. As a result, mine-action 
organizations are often left to develop the pro-
grams and provide assistance with little or no 
cooperation from the local governments. 
Logistical Concerns
The challenges mine-action programs face 
in complex situations are enormous, including 
providing protection for personnel and assets, 
complex logistics, restricted movement, con-
tinual changes in deployment plans, and ob-
stacles preventing removal of ERW in the field. 
These problems are persistent for those working 
in countries such as Afghanistan, Burundi, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sri Lanka 
and Sudan, to name a few.
Economic Difficulties
Despite post-conflict government declara-
tives and a genuine enthusiasm to assist with 
mine-action activities, many governments do 
not have the financial or organizational abili-
ty to assist with mine-action operations. This 
limitation often puts a strain on the finances of 
mine-action organizations operating in post-
conflict countries. Organizations may find they 
are unable to access task sites, and that their 
field staff need additional protection, usually in 
a form of an armed escort. However, the orga-
nizations usually have to endure all costs relat-
ed to this protection, such as fuel, food, daily 
wages and transport. In the case of Fondation 
Suisse de Déminage program in Burundi, assis-
tance the authorities offered was in the form of 
a few indifferent, poorly equipped 
and unpaid police officers provided 
as armed escorts. Furthermore, the 
police officers were suddenly with-
drawn when the local government 
felt their assistance was required 
elsewhere. Nevertheless, tasks need 
to be completed and deadlines met. 
While mine-action organizations 
may be able to afford these addition-
al short-term burdens on their bud-
gets and staff, these programs can 
rarely afford to provide such sub-
stantial assistance for extended pe-
riods of time. 
Additional Considerations
Mine-action organizations must 
juggle the program’s goals and the 
donor’s requirements with the real-
ity of the situation on the ground. 
Program strategies, especially pro-
posals for mine-action activities, 
are written assuming the work will 
be carried out in a relatively sta-
ble situation and are often based 
on the assumption of minimum 
costs, sometimes with unrealistic 
goals, deadlines and financial re-
quirements, in order to win a bid or 
secure funding. In addition to bureau-
cratic issues, mine-action organiza-
tions must take a country’s specific 
security issues and insurgency con-
straints, as well as the ethnic and re-
ligious background of national staff, 
into consideration. 
In teams of mixed nationalities, 
organizations will face challenges 
regarding supervisory issues. For 
example, organizations must con-
sider the implications of sending 
mine-action teams composed primar-
ily of Muslims to work in a Serbian 
(Christian)-dominated area in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, or Shiites and Sunnis to 
work in religious conflict zones in 
Iraq. Additional limiting factors in-
clude the restrictions placed by do-
nors on the use of funds, the type of 
intervention used (mine-risk educa-
tion versus ERW clearance), and the 
prioritization of mine-action tasks. 
This prioritization is especially lim-
iting when United Nations Mine 
Action Centers cater to the host 
country’s wishes, often overlooking 
humanitarian mine-action inter-
ests, and when the corruption and 
ethical structure of national mine-
action authorities manipulate task 
prioritization on the basis of ethnic 
bias, further exacerbating an already 
difficult situation. 
Conclusion
Post-conflict areas are gener-
ally unstable and require mine ac-
tion to help return to normalcy. One 
can be certain that sudden, unpre-
dictable changes are the only con-
stants in this industry. The only way 
to help an organization cope with 
these complex situations is to care-
fully perform a pre-program analy-
sis that sets realistic goals, deadlines 
and methods of evaluation. Further-
more, in choosing individuals with 
experience managing mine-action 
activities in post-conflict environ-
ments, organizations can increase 
the success of a mine-action pro-
gram. Ultimately, organizations must 
learn to consider the lack of host-gov-
ernment support coupled with sud-
den and unpredictable change and 
work to avert these pitfalls, thereby 
helping to ensure the effective tran-
sition from a post-conflict situation 
to one of stability and safety. 
See Endnotes, Page 77 
Adrien Buhire, an FSD deminer, points to a hole in his truck caused by the bullet that 
wounded him during an attack on the FSD convoy in Burundi (March 2008).
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